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On the Nature and Existence of God, by Richard Gale. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. viii and 422. 
THOMAS D. SENOR, The University of Arkansas 
Richard Gale's book On the Nature and Existence of God is a detailed, at 
times difficult, yet highly readable discussion of issues and arguments 
central to the philosophy of religion. What makes Gale's book particularly 
enjoyable is the fact that he doesn't seem to have any particular agenda. 
That is, many books about the divine nature are believers' attempts to 
demonstrate the coherence or logical consistency of the traditional theistic 
conception of God; while there is nothing wrong with atheist's trying to 
make her case, there is something philosophically refreshing about Gale's 
stance in this book. He seems fully imbued with the Socratic spirit: he will 
go where the argument leads. Sometimes this means taking sides with the-
ists; other times he is the atheist's ally. 
The book is divided into two halves: one concerning atheological argu-
ments, one concerning theological arguments. Gale explains that he has 
reversed the traditional order, discussing the atheological arguments first 
because (or so he claims) many of the former objections to religious belief 
result in an alteration of the concept of God. Thus, by the end of the first 
half of the book, the theist will have a concept that has been honed to with-
stand the better arguments against the coherence of theism. Equipped 
with the best candidate concept, we are then in a position to see whether it 
can be shown that there exists a being who matches this description. 
Gale begins the conceptual exploration with a discussion of the attribute 
of omnipotence. One can see straight-away why Gale claims that consider-
ing atheological objections will lead to a refinement of the theist's concep-
tion of God. As the initial characterization of omnipotence, Gale suggests 
that "an omnipotent being can do anything" (p. 18). When familiar objec-
tions to this definition are raised, Gale claims that "[t]here is considerable 
room for conceptual reform here" (p. 19). The 'reform' that Gale has in 
mind is limiting the domain of omnipotence to the logically possible. But 
it's hard to see why the theist should think that any alteration of a first-pass 
definition of a theological predicate requires conceptual change. Rather, 
one should suppose that the preliminary definition has been found lacking, 
much as Gettier's examples showed not that the concept of knowledge 
required adjustment but that the justified-true-belief account of knowledge 
was inadequate. 
One of the many features that make this a remarkable book is the num-
ber of philosophical issues that are discussed in its 387 pages. In addition 
to omnipotence, Gale discusses the attributes of immutability, omniscience, 
and eternity by examining various arguments that purport to show that 
two or more of them are incompatible (e.g., omniscience and immutabili-
ty). The atheological section concludes with a discussion of the problem of 
evil and a presentation of an argument based on the extreme modal real-
ism of David Lewis. Throughout, Gale's discussion is never simplistic or 
rushed, and is generally insightful and original (not to mention humorous 
and sometimes irreverent). 
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The second half of the book is a consideration of arguments for the exis-
tence of God and for the pragmatic justification of religious belief. Various 
versions of the ontological and cosmological arguments are considered as 
are arguments from religious experience and pragmatic arguments from 
prudence and morality. 
In the end, Gale concludes that while the atheological arguments force 
changes in the theist's conception of God, they aren't sufficient to show that 
God doesn't exist; similarly, the arguments for the existence of God sur-
veyed in the book fail to demonstrate God's existence. Gale points out that 
he hasn't considered inductive arguments, but on the assumption that they 
fare no better than their deductive cousins, "faith would lack any rational 
justification" (p. 387). Gale ends by saying that this conclusion would be 
embraced by Kierkegaardian theists, and that he resonates "to their view of 
faith as a subjective passion that outstrips our reason" (p. 387). 
In a short review, one can't hope to discuss every point in the book with 
which one might want to take issue. What I will do for the remainder is to 
consider briefly what Gale has to say in his chapter on arguments from 
religious experience. 
It is striking that the relevant chapter in Gale's book (Chapter Eight) is 
entitled "Religious Experience Arguments." Now in the context of Gale's 
writing, this is not so odd; for he claims that if religious experience is justifi-
cation-conferring, then it is suited to serve as a basis for a good argument for 
God's existence. However, Gale's chief target in this chapter, William 
Alston, explicitly states that one should not construe him as offering a theistic 
argument from religious experience. Why, then, does Gale insist upon read-
ing Alston as though he were offering an argument for God's existence? 
The answer can be readily seen. Gale contends that if religious experi-
ences constitute evidence for those who have them, if they justify the belief 
of the experient, they will serve as the basis for a theistic argument. Gale 
claims "that a cognitive experience's evidential status is not person-relative 
is a fundamental conceptual requirement for an experience having cogni-
tive status, a point that is often missed by those who defend the cognitivity 
of religious experiences" (p. 288). 
I think Gale is wrong on this score. Consider an analogy with sense per-
ception. Suppose I have a visual experience with the content that X is 0. 
On the basis of this, I come to believe that X is 0. Now does my justifica-
tion provide you with justification for believing that X is 0? Well, surely 
not if you don't know that I have had an experience that indicates that X is 
0. But suppose I tell you that I have had such an experience. Have I then 
passed along my justification to you? I don't think I have. And the reason 
is simple: I haven't been able to give you my reason for believing X is 0. 
My reason is my visual experience (or at least my memory of such an expe-
rience), and my reporting this to you doesn't give you that reason. Now it 
might be that my reporting to you my experience gives you a different jus-
tification than the one I have, but since it isn't grounded in the same rea-
son, it is hard to see why we should suppose that, necessarily, my reason 
provides you with precisely the same justification that it provides me with. 
The significance of this dispute is that if Gale is right, then showing that 
there is no good argument from religious experience will show that reli-
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gious experience is epistemically of little or no value to the theist (apart 
from the possibility of a good inductive argument, which Gale acknowl-
edges he hasn't considered). However, it is at very least arguable that the 
primary epistemic role that religious experience has to play for the theist is 
not as the foundation of an argument for God's existence, but rather as a 
ground for directly or immediately justified religious belief. On this view, 
religious experience provides one with a non-inferential, non-propositional 
reason for belief in God in much the same way that my experience of my 
word processor provides me with a non-inferential, non-propositional rea-
son to believe in its existence. It is worth noting that many epistemologists 
have held that if my word processor belief (and my other physical world 
beliefs) requires me to have a non-circular justificatory argument, I'm in 
epistemic hot water. So Gale's construal of the epistemic role of religious 
experience as primarily inferential is at odds with what the majority of cur-
rent defenders of the value of such experience are arguing. 
Despite this problem, I think that Gale's book is splendid. No one work-
ing in philosophical theology can afford not to take note of it. While some 
of the argumentation will be over the heads of standard undergraduates, I 
highly recommend it for use in graduate courses in philosophy of religion. 
Docs God's Existence Need Proof?, by Richard Messer. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press,1993. Pp.160. $29.95 (cloth). 
ALAN PADGEIT, Azusa Pacific University 
This is a helpful book that does a good job of laying out the issues in an 
important area of philosophy of religion. It illustrates the difference that 
deep disagreemnt over our basic approach to philosophy makes to theolo-
gy and philosophy of religion. The book, however, is not really about 
arguments for the existence of God, as the title might suggest. Instead, it 
compares the differing approaches to philosophy in the work of to well-
known British scholars, D. Z. Phillips and Richard Swinburne. It con-
cludes, in the light of such fundamental philosophical pluralism, that some 
relativist position is the most reasonable view to adopt. 
Chapter One looks at the problem of religious language. It begins by 
discussing Swinburne's theory of religious language, and finds three prin-
ciples (assumptions) at work in his philosophy: cognitivity, expressibility, 
and rationality. He notes that religious language is literal and factual on 
"most" occasions for Swinburne, and analogical on the others (6). The 
existence of God is a purported fact which is either true or false, and which 
claim we make can be assessed on the basis of evidence. Messer labels this 
the "traditional" school. On the other hand, Phillips and the other 
"devout" Wittgensteinians (Malcolm, Rhees, Winch), have a very different 
conception of the meaning of religious language. For them, philosophy is 
descriptive and "grammatical" rather than analytical or normative. 
Much of this chapter covers old ground, but it is interesting reading. 
Messer clearly favors the Wittgensteinian approach. "To think otherwise is 
